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I. INTRODUCTION
Reinhard Siekaczek, a skeptical former accountant of Siemens A.G., expressed little optimism that Siemens’ violations
of German law and the U.S. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act’s
(“FCPA”)1 prohibitions against bribing foreign officials would
deter others in a world full of corruption. Siekaczek states,
“[p]eople will only say about Siemens that they were unlucky
and that they broke the 11th commandment. The 11th commandment is: ‘Don’t get caught.’”2 At Siemens, Siekaczek participated in large-scale bribery by helping maintain a budget of
tens of millions of dollars per year that was dedicated to bribing foreign officials, what one bureaucrat described as the
“Siemens’ business model” and “institutionalized corruption.”3
Eventually, Siemens and many of its subsidiaries paid a heavy
price for getting caught: over $2.6 billion spent in fees, fines to
the U.S. and Germany, and corporate reform measures to replace corruption with compliance.4
While many American businesspeople and companies who
understand the realities of doing business in foreign countries
would likely agree with Siekaczek’s lamentation, the problem
with the 11th commandment is that “not getting caught” for
bribery is becoming increasingly difficult in the U.S. This is so
not only because of the FCPA prevents the making of “corrupt
payments” to foreign officials for the purpose of promoting
business interests, but because the Department of Justice
(“DOJ”) is strictly enforcing the FCPA by investigating more

1 Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1 to -3 (2010); see also
Brochure, U.S. Dep’t of Justice & U.S. Dep’t of Commerce, Foreign Corrupt
Practices Act: Antibribery Provisions (Oct. 1999) [hereinafter Lay-Person’s
Guide to the FCPA]
2 T. Christian Miller & Siri Schubert, At Siemens, Bribery was Just a
Line Item, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 20, 2008.
3 Id.
4 Id.
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cases,5 levying extremely high fines in plea bargains,6 and even
performing sting operations through the Federal Bureau of Investigation.7
Avoiding notice is likely hard enough in a situation where
only one individual is paying bribes, but bribery naturally becomes harder to conceal when multiple parties are involved.
Such is the case in the world of international project finance.8
Because the FCPA’s reach is not restricted to the people who
physically pay the money or make an improper offer, liability
can extend much further than U.S. companies and businesspeople might expect and hope. Consequently, complicated issues of liability exist for many project finance participants because any one project can include many people and entities—
lenders, agents, project sponsors, project companies, constructors, operators, and so forth. Thus, rather than hoping to “not
get caught,” project finance participants should take active
steps throughout the duration of a project to identify potential
violations and prevent bribes. This strategy presents participants with the best opportunity for avoiding FCPA liability,
possible jail time, and severe economic and other consequences
to the project.9

5

Shearman & Sterling LLP, Recent Trends and Patterns in FCPA Enforcement, in CTR. FOR CONTINUING LEGAL EDUC. ET AL., NATIONAL INSTITUTE
ON THE FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT, at A-8 (2008).
6 Steven A. Tyrrell, DOJ Prosecution of BAE Heralds Continued Aggressive FCPA Enforcement Environment, WEIL (Feb. 8, 2010), http://www.weil.
com/news/pubdetail.aspx?pub=9725 (stating that Siemens paid a criminal
penalty of $450 million).
7 Press Release, Dep’t of Justice, Twenty-Two Executives and Employees
of Military and Law Enforcement Products Companies Charged in Foreign
Bribery Scheme (Jan. 19, 2010).
8 Catherine Pedamon, How is Convergence Best Achieved in International
Project Finance?, 24 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 1272, 1273 (2001) (describing project
finance as “a debt technique used for the development of a public infrastructure project . . . where lenders look primarily to the cash flow produced by the
project to service their debt.”).
9 While much has been written about both the FCPA and international
project finance, not much exists about the two together. This study attempts
to fill that void. While FCPA has anti-bribery and accounting provisions, this
work will only focus on the anti-bribery provisions. Finally, this paper will
first expound upon the FCPA, then summarize key aspects of project finance,
and conclude by looking at many FCPA problems and solutions in project finance.
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II. FCPA STATUTE AND EXPLANATION
A. Liable Parties
The anti-bribery provisions of the FCPA apply to various
parties that utilize project finance to carry out foreign endeavors and projects. First, the FCPA applies to any issuer of “securities that have been registered in the United States or who
is required to file periodic reports with the SEC,”10 as well as to
“any officer, director, employee, or agent of such issuer or any
stockholder thereof acting on behalf of such issuer.”11 Second,
“domestic concerns” are subject to the FCPA.12 A “domestic
concern” is a U.S. citizen, resident, national, or “any corporation, partnership, association, joint-stock company, business
trust, unincorporated organization, or sole proprietorship” that
has the U.S. as its primary place of business or that is organized under any U.S. state or territory law.13 Domestic concerns can also be liable where they worked or acted for foreign
subsidiaries of U.S. corporations.14 Third, “any person” who is
not an issuer or a domestic concern, or “any officer, director,
employee, or agent of such person or any stockholder thereof
acting on behalf of such person” who takes a step toward violating the FCPA in the U.S., is liable.15 Any “person” means “any
natural person other than a [U.S.] national . . . or any corporation, partnership, association, joint-stock company, business
trust, unincorporated organization, or sole proprietorship” not
organized under any law of the U.S.16
The FCPA also applies to any of these parties that give or
promise something of value to a person while knowing that
some or all of the item will be used to violate the FCPA.17 The
giving party is deemed to have knowledge when the giving party is aware that the other party is “engaging in such conduct,
that such circumstance exists, or that such result is substan-

10

Lay-Person’s Guide to the FCPA, supra note 1, at 3.
15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1(a) (2010).
12 § 78dd-2(a).
13 § 78dd-2(h)(1)(b).
14 Lay-Person’s Guide to the FCPA, supra note 1, at 3.
15 § 78dd-3(a).
16 §§ 78dd-1a3, 2a3, 3a3.
17 Id.
11
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tially certain to occur.”18 Alternatively, knowledge exists when
a party has “a firm belief that such circumstance exists or that
such result is substantially certain to occur”19 and there is a
“high probability of the existence of such circumstance, unless
the person actually believes that such circumstance does not
exist.”20 This standard prevents directors from escaping liability when they did nothing in the face of red flags.21 Actions of
agents and consultants,22 as well as subsidiaries,23 can place liability on an issuer, domestic concern, or “any person” if these
latter actors had knowledge.
B. Prohibited Actions
The FCPA’s anti-bribery provisions prohibit these actors
from using “the mails or any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce corruptly in furtherance of an offer, payment,
promise to pay, authorization of the payment of any money, offer, gift, promise to give, or authorization of the giving of anything of value” to any foreign official, political party, official of
a political party, political party candidate, or anyone who the
actor knows will commit one of these forbidden acts with the
purpose of “obtaining or retaining business” with anyone.24 A
failed offer or promise is enough for liability.25 Obtaining and
retaining business is done by:
influencing any act or decision of [the foreign person]; inducing
such [official] to do or omit to do any act in violation of the lawful
duty of [the person]; securing any improper advantage; or inducing [the person] to use his or its influence with a foreign government or instrumentality thereof to affect or influence any act or
decision of that person.26

18

§§ 78dd-1(f)(2)(A)(i), 78dd-2(h)(3)(A)(i), 78dd-3(f)(3)(A)(i).
§§ 78dd-1(f)(2)(A)(ii), 78dd-2(h)(3)(A)(ii), 78dd-3(f)(3)(A)(ii).
20 §§ 78dd-1(f)(2)(B), 78dd-2(h)(3)(B), 78dd-3(f)(3)(B).
21 See, e.g., David E. Dworsky, Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 46 AM.
CRIM. L. REV. 671, 682-83 (2009).
22 ROBERT W. TARUN, BASICS OF THE FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT:
WHAT EVERY GENERAL COUNSEL, TRANSACTIONAL LAWYER AND WHITE COLLAR
CRIMINAL LAWYER SHOULD KNOW 26 (2006).
23 Lay-Person’s Guide to the FCPA, supra note 1, at 3.
24 §§ 78dd-1(a), 2(a), 3(a).
25 Lay-Person’s Guide to the FCPA, supra note 1, at 3.
26 §§ 78dd-1(a), 2(a), 3(a).
19
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Various elements of these prohibited actions, when defined, show how far liability can reach. First, interstate commerce is defined as “trade, commerce, transportation, or communication among the several States; or between any foreign
country and any State; or between any State and any place or
ship outside thereof,” which includes communicating between
these places through a telephone or other medium.27 Therefore, an airline flight between states, or between the U.S. and
other countries,28 as well as a wire transfer,29 a fax,30 an
email,31 or a letter,32 could be enough to engage the FCPA.
Furthermore, issuers and domestic concerns can be liable for
FCPA violations anywhere in the world.33 If issuers or domestic concerns use any means of interstate commerce to bring
about a corrupt payment, the U.S. has territorial jurisdiction.34
If, however, they take any action in the furtherance of a corrupt payment outside the U.S., no use of interstate commerce is
necessary35 because the U.S. can maintain jurisdiction based
on nationality.36 For persons that are not issuers or domestic
concerns, jurisdiction and liability depend on whether any action took place within the U.S.37
Offering help on the meaning of “corruptly,” the Eighth
Circuit approved a jury instruction defining “corruptly” as prohibited action that is “intended to induce the recipient to misuse his official position or to influence someone else to do so,”
and is “done voluntarily and intentionally and with a bad purpose of accomplishing either an unlawful end or result, or a
lawful end or result by some unlawful method or means.”38

27

§§ 78dd-2(h)(5)(A), 3(f)(5)(A).
Lay-Person’s Guide to the FCPA, supra note 1, at 3.
29 Id.
30 See, e.g., Rotec Indus. v. Mitsubishi Corp., 163 F. Supp. 2d 1268, 1279
(D. Or. 2001), aff'd, 348 F.3d 1116 (9th Cir. 2003).
31 See, e.g., MAYER BROWN LLP, A POCKET GUIDE TO THE FOREIGN
CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT 3 (2009).
32 §§ 78dd-1(a), 2(a), 3(a).
33 §§ 78dd-1(g)(1), 2(i)(1).
34 Lay-Person’s Guide to the FCPA, supra note 1, at 3.
35 §§ 78dd-1(g)(1), 2(i)(1).
36 Lay-Person’s Guide to the FCPA, supra note 1, at 3.
37 Peter W. Schroth, The United States and International Bribery Conventions, 50 AM. J. COMP. L. 593, 602 (2002).
38 United States v. Liebo, 923 F.2d 1308, 1312 (8th Cir. 1991).
28
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Third, a foreign official is “any officer or employee of a foreign government or any department, agency, or instrumentality thereof, or of a public international organization, or any person acting in an official capacity for or on behalf of” any of
those listed parties.39 This definition can become quite complicated in situations where joint private and public ownership
exists and in certain industries, such as defense contracting,
where a government’s stake is not apparent on the surface.40
An employee of a foreign firm might be a foreign official if the
government appoints him or her, such as military personnel
appointed to work for a defense contractor, or if the firm can be
considered an “instrumentality” of the government.41 It is clear
that employees of an enterprise completely owned by a government can be a foreign official.42 Additionally, the DOJ has
emphasized that the official’s position—whether high or low
ranking—does not matter.43
Fourth, obtaining or retaining business means more than
acquiring a contract or having one renewed.44 For instance, in
United States v. Kay, the Fifth Circuit broadly construed the
FCPA’s “obtaining or retaining business” requirement to include American businessmen who bribed to Haitian customs
officials in order to receive discounted duties and sales taxes on
their rice imports.45 The Court of Appeals remanded the case
to the district court to decide if the bribes were “designed to induce foreign officials unlawfully to perform their official duties
in administering the laws and regulations of their country to
produce a result intended to assist in obtaining or retaining
business in that country.”46 Thus, it seems that many actions
could fall under the statute as long as there is sufficient con-

39

§§ 78dd-1(f)(1)(A), 2(h)(2)(A), 3(f)(2)(A).
See Sharie A. Brown & Brian S. Chilton, Foreign Corrupt Practices
Act, 11 BRIEFLY, no. 5, 2007 at iii, 10-11.
41 Id. at 11.
42 See, e.g., Press Release, Dep’t of Justice, Two Former Executives of
Itxc Corp Plead Guilty and Former Regional Director Sentenced in Foreign
Bribery Scheme (July 27, 2007).
43 Lay-Person’s Guide to the FCPA, supra note 1, at 3 (stating that “[t]he
FCPA applies to payments to any public official, regardless of rank or position”).
44 Id. at 4.
45 United States v. Kay, 359 F.3d 738 (5th Cir. 2004).
46 Id. at 761.
40
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nection between the action and an intention to obtain or retain
business. Further, the business sought need not be with the
government; it can be with any person.47
C. Exceptions
The anti-bribery provisions do allow a few exceptions. One
can pay a foreign official for “routine governmental actions.”48
Routine governmental actions are services “ordinarily and
commonly performed” by foreign officials for: (1) obtaining
permits, licenses, or other official documents to qualify a person to do business in a foreign country; (2) processing governmental papers, such as visas and work orders; (3) providing police protection, mail pick-up and delivery, or scheduling
inspections associated with contract performance or inspections
related to transit of goods across country; (4) providing phone
service, power and water supply, loading and unloading cargo,
or protecting perishable products or commodities from deterioration; and (5) similar actions.49 Such activities do not entail
“acquiring or retaining business,” as used in the FCPA.50 A
party can also make “a reasonable and bona fide expenditure”
to a foreign official, which includes “travel and lodging expenses . . . directly related to the promotion, demonstration, or explanation of products or services; or the execution or performance of a contract with a foreign government or agency
thereof.”51 Metcalf & Eddy Inc. gave an Egyptian official 150
percent of his per diem in advance, paid the expenses that the
per diem should have covered, paid for air travel for him and
his family, and gave other gifts to sway his view, these payments did not meet the threshold.52
Furthermore, a party can use the affirmative defense that

47

See 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1(a), 2(a), 3(a).
§§ 78dd-1(b), 2(b), 3(b).
49 §§ 78dd-1(f)(3)(A), (h)(4)(A), 3(f)(4)(A).
50 Lay-Person’s Guide to the FCPA, supra note 1, at 5.
51 §§ 78dd-1(c)(2), 2(c)(2), 3(c)(2).
52 Matthew S. Queler et. al., Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, in
48

PROSKAUER ON INTERNATIONAL LITIGATION AND ARBITRATION:
MANAGING, RESOLVING, AND AVOIDING CROSS-BORDER BUSINESS OR
REGULATORY DISPUTES (2007), available at http://www.proskauerguide.com
/law_topics/27/I (citing United States v. Metcalf & Eddy Inc., C.A. No. 99CV12566-N6 (D. Mass. 1999).
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the prohibited action is legal according to the “written laws and
regulations” of the country targeted by the bribe.53 In determining whether the action is legal in the foreign country, one
should look at the “payment, not the payer.”54 Thus, the payer
of a bribe in Azerbaijan who was exonerated based on his claim
that he was extorted could not use this defense that his actions
were legal; regardless of his exoneration, the payment was still
illegal in Azerbaijan.55 This defense is not often successful because “[t]here is . . . no country with laws or regulations that
authorize or permit bribery of public officials.”56
D. Enforcement and Penalties
The DOJ can enforce the anti-bribery provisions through
criminal punishment for any party.57 Criminal punishment
can come in the form of a fine of up to $2 million for a domestic
concern that is an organization or for “any person” when it refers to a foreign organization or entity,58 or a fine of up to
$100,000 for any individual.59 Under the Alternative Fines
Act, the DOJ can pursue a fine of up to double the benefit that
was sought by the bribe.60 Employers and principals cannot
pay any fines levied against individuals.61 Also, individuals
can be subject to imprisonment of up to five years.62 The DOJ
and Securities Exchange Commission can also impose civil liability on any party for up to $10,000 and other fines of up to
$500,000.63 The Attorney General has injunctive authority to
prevent a violation from happening.64

53

§§ 7dd-1 to -3.
United States v. Kozeny, 582 F. Supp. 2d 535, 539 (S.D.N.Y. 2008).
55 Id. at 539-41.
56 Richard M. Strassberg & Kyle A. Wombolt, Beware Foreign Corrupt
Practices Act Traps, N.Y. L.J., July 21, 2008, at n.2.
57 See, e.g., Lay-Person’s Guide to the FCPA, supra note 1, at 5.
58 §§ 78dd-2(g)(1)(A), dd-3(e)(1)(A).
59 §§ 78dd-2(g)(2)(A), dd-3(e)(2)(A).
60 See, e.g., Lay-Person’s Guide to the FCPA, supra note 1, at 5
61 Id.
62 §§ 78dd-2(g)(2)(A), dd-3(e)(2)(A).
63 Lay-Person’s Guide to the FCPA, supra note 1, at 5.
64 §§ 78dd-2(d)(1), dd-3(d)(1).
54
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III. INTERNATIONAL PROJECT FINANCE
Project finance, though defined in many ways, usually refers to
a nonrecourse or limited recourse financing structure in which
debt, equity, and credit enhancement are combined for the construction and operation, or the refinancing, of a particular facility
in a capital-intensive industry, in which lenders based credit appraisals on the projected revenues from the operation of the facility, rather than the general assets or the credit of the sponsor of
the facility, and rely on the assets of the facility, including any
revenue-producing contracts and other cash flow generated by
the facility, as collateral for the debt.65

Project finance in the cross-border context is very complex
and involves a large amount of participants and planning. An
essential party is the project sponsor, which comprises one or
more companies or entities that will develop and seek the benefit from the project.66 Before the project reaches its development stage, the project sponsor will carry out a number of
measures, including an extensive feasibility study of the technical and financial potential of the project67 and a development
agreement with any other interested sponsors.68 If the project
sponsor wishes to continue with the project, it will decide on
the business vehicle that will carry out the project.69 The vehicle, often a special-purpose vehicle created for the project (the
“project company”),70 will participate in any required bidding
processes in the host country.71
The project company will need to acquire the various forms
of government approval required for the project such as permits and licenses,72 and negotiate contracts with the host gov-

65 SCOTT L. HOFFMAN, THE LAW AND BUSINESS OF INTERNATIONAL PROJECT
FINANCE 4 (3d ed. 2008). Nonrecourse is where the project sponsor is completely free of debts or liabilities for the project, while the more frequently
used limited recourse is where there are limited debts and obligations. Id. at
5.
66 Id. at 71.
67 Id. at 84.
68 Id.
69 Id. at 85.
70 Id. at 71.
71 Id. at 37.
72 See, e.g., ANDREW FIGHT, INTRODUCTION TO PROJECT FINANCE 11 (2006).
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ernment.73 These contracts include, among others, concession
agreements that bestow the right to carry out the project,
build-own-transfer agreements under which the completed project transfers to the host at some future time, arbitration
agreements for resolving any dispute with the government, and
an assurance that the government will not expropriate the project.74 Many risks are present in all of these processes, which
mean that parties must recognize and allocate risks to those
who can best mitigate the risks’ potential impact on the project.75
Each project will likely have some combination of debt
(created by a loan between one or more private or government
institutions), collateral security (which can come as assignments of revenue from the project or contractual rights), and
equity.76 To acquire a loan, the borrowing entity—usually the
project company—will usually contract its debt with a variety
of lenders.77 Commercial lenders such as banks, international
agencies such as the World Bank, bilateral agencies such as the
U.S. Export-Import Bank, and bondholders who can buy debt
in bond form are all lenders that can finance a project.78 The
lender will make the loan based on the debtor’s credit ratings
as reported by rating agencies.79
Once funding is available, the project will require a number contracts to construct,80 supply,81 insure,82 or otherwise assist the development, completion, and operation of the project.83
These extensive negotiations are complex, primarily because
“[e]ach participant brings into the project what other participants are lacking: financing ability, political authority, technical know-how, procurement of supplies, human resources,
etc.,” and contracts are an effective method of allocating the

73

See, e.g., HOFFMAN, supra note 65, at 37.
Id. at 145–48.
75 Id. at 27–28.
76 Id. at 8.
77 Id. at 71.
78 Id. at 72–73.
79 Id. at 73.
80 FIGHT, supra note 72, at 11.
81 Id.
82 HOFFMAN, supra note 65, at 77.
83 FIGHT, supra note 72, at 11.
74
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expertise and comparative advantage of each party.84 These
contracts include many key agreements, including force
majeure clauses with lenders and constructors for assurances
in case of unforeseen disasters,85 cost overrun agreements to
identify who will pay for excess costs,86 and covenants to ensure
that the project is constructed and operated as planned.87
Following this development stage, suppliers, output purchasers, and contractors arrive, which necessitates more contracts and guarantees.88 Risks increase during the construction phase because the project company is spending money
while the project is not yet profitable.89 These risks can be
eased through construction contracts and performance promises.90 Similarly, contracts are key to the operation of the project
when construction is over; agreements with the operator91 and
others will handle unanticipated low revenues or political problems92 and control the flow of inputs necessary to the project’s
operation, such as fuel.93
IV. IDENTIFYING FCPA PROBLEMS AND SOLUTIONS IN
INTERNATIONAL PROJECT FINANCE
Project finance parties must understand the FCPA and its
implications for projects. The host government is an absolutely
necessary part of any project, which means that “project development is particularly susceptible to temptations of bribery.”94
Indeed, whenever a foreign official is involved with the project,
the risk of a FCPA violation exists. Furthermore, the number
of parties means that there are more people that could violate
the FCPA. This liability can be deadly: “[i]n some instances,

84

Christophe Dugue, Dispute Resolution in International Project Finance
Transactions, 24 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 1064, 1064 (2001).
85 HOFFMAN, supra note 65, at 184, 326.
86 Id. at 350.
87 Id. at 77.
88 Id. at 73–74.
89 FIGHT, supra note 72, at 11.
90 Id.
91 HOFFMAN, supra note 67, at 74. The operator operates, maintains, and
makes any repairs on the project.
92 FIGHT, supra note 72, at 11.
93 HOFFMAN, supra note 65, at 188–89.
94 Id. at 397.
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the constraints imposed by the FCPA may cause a US business
to delay or restructure a project, seek a different business
partner, decline work, or, in very rare circumstances, exit a geography.”95 Thus, parties must take many monitoring steps
through a project to prevent violations of the law.
A. Risk Assessment
Throughout the life of a project, the parties will often assess and attempt to mitigate whatever risks exist.96 A project
will inevitably face many risks, such as risk of expropriation by
the government of the country where the project occurs,97 risk
of drop in demand of the finished project by the consumers in
the project country,98 and risk of cost overruns.99 The risk
structuring process is vital to a project, and is where “risks are
identified, analyzed, quantified, mitigated, and allocated so
that no individual risk threatens [any part of the project].”100
This allocation can occur through contracts with those that are
best able to prevent problems.101
One risk that parties in a project should not overlook is the
risk of an FCPA violation, which is present whenever a participant must work with foreign officials. Any project requires a
great deal of contact with the local government to acquire essential licenses, permits, and agreements, any of which could
involve an improper payment to facilitate the approval.102 A
main problem for projects is that developing countries—
precisely where many opportunities exist due to the lack of infrastructure and need for projects—often have cultures where
bribery is necessary to do business.103 Regardless of the host
culture, any project that involves FCPA-liable parties is at risk
of liability.
95

MAYER BROWN LLP, supra note 31, at 7.
Id. at 28–29.
97 PETER K. NEVITT & FRANK J. FABOZZI, PROJECT FINANCING 20 (7th ed.
2000).
98 David Blumental, Sources of Funds and Risk Management for International Energy Projects, 16 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 267, 272 (1998).
99 Id.
100 HOFFMAN, supra note 65, at 27.
101 Id. at 27–28.
102 See infra Part IV.E.
103 See, e.g., NEVITT & FABOZZI, supra note 97, at 27.
96
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Therefore, assessment of FCPA risk in the host country is
vital. Using the risk structuring process,104 project participants
should identify, analyze, quantify, mitigate, and allocate the
risk of FCPA violations by looking at data, indices, or other information about corruption in the country where the project
will occur. Some suggest using Transparency International’s
Corruption Perceptions Index to perform this analysis.105 The
Corruption Perceptions Index for 2009 lists among the most
corrupt countries in the world, for example, multiple oil-rich
countries where projects could or do occur: Chad, Equatorial
Guinea, Angola, and Venezuela.106 This, or any other form of
measurement, is an important aspect of assessing FCPA liability risk in a project. If a project sponsor knows that doing
business in a country is impossible without bribing the officials,
or if companies from countries where anti-bribery provisions do
not exist will take advantage of the parties’ FCPA compliance,107 the sponsor might see the bribery risk as too great to
take on the project. When the project begins, the risks of bribery still exist. As the risk structure analysis says, parties
should allocate risks to those who are in the best position to
handle it.108 A number of project participants can endanger the
project through FCPA violations, which means that parties
should allocate the risk of breaking this law to everyone involved in order to protect the project.
Not only is the risk of FCPA violations its own risk that
project parties should consider, FCPA violations play important roles in other aspects of the risk structure process. The
stages of a project—development, design engineering and construction, start-up, and operation—all have individual risks109
that FCPA problems can exacerbate. For example, in the development phase, there is the risk that the government will not
give necessary approvals.110 One might try to compensate for

104

HOFFMAN, supra note 65, at 27.
See, e.g., MAYER BROWN LLP, supra note 31, at 11.
106 Corruption Perceptions Index 2009, TRANSPARENCY INT’L, http://www.
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the risk of failure with a bribe, which creates the risk of FCPA
liability. Throughout the project, parties must consider the
risk that FCPA violation or compliance plays.
B. Working with Local Agents, Partners, and Counsel
To maneuver the regulations and laws of the host country
and find local labor, business, and other necessary aspects to
complete the project, it is “essential, as a matter of operational
necessity” that the project enlist local agents.111 Local agents
and consultants can provide vital help to projects because they
can use expertise and contacts to connect with important government officials, push through paperwork for required government approvals, and help the project parties become familiar with local businesses.112 Local attorneys are helpful
because of their knowledge of the local law113 and can be very
useful if they know important government officials.114 Sometimes host governments require that projects have at least one
local ownership partner, which makes working with locals obligatory in those countries.115
While their role is vital to a project, these local parties’ actions can create FCPA liability for themselves and other project
parties. The FCPA has jurisdiction over non-U.S. nationals
and corporations or other business entities organized in a foreign country116 as long as at least some action made toward violating the FCPA using some form of interstate commerce takes
place within U.S. territory.117 If the person negotiated a contract with the U.S. project sponsor via email, phone conversations, or fax, the person is subject to the FCPA.118 Also, agents
of issuers and domestic concerns are specifically subject to the
FCPA.119 Furthermore, issuer or domestic concern project par-
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ties cannot offer, pay, promise a payment, or authorize a payment to any person who the issuer or domestic concern knows
will use all or part of the money or item to commit a prohibited
action with a foreign official.120 To establish corrupt intent for
a third party’s actions, the DOJ can show an issuer’s or domestic concern’s “willful blindness” of violation warning signs and
purposeful avoidance of learning about violations.121
Liability for the actions of a third party agent is not a remote possibility. The large majority of FCPA enforcement
comes from actions of foreign third parties.122 This fact should
put project sponsors and companies on guard to prevent prohibited actions by local agents, consultants, and counsel. While
problems are difficult to foresee, a large amount of due diligence can help project parties make smart decisions on local
help. A project sponsor will wisely select a local agent based on
objective criteria such as the agent’s competence to accomplish
the designed purpose of the agreement.123 The sponsor should
perform an extensive verification on the local’s reputation
based on business references, information from government or
private institutions in the host country, interviews with the local,124 and even through reports a special investigator can find
out.125 One way to avoid liability is to not hire a local with a
checkered past. The parties should document these due diligence efforts,126 which can help them show that they tried to
learn of FCPA problems.
The project sponsor can also take steps toward ensuring
FCPA compliance through contractual representations, covenants, and termination clauses. The contract between the parties can include a representation that establishes the local’s
familiarity with the FCPA, which will teach the person about
the importance of the FCPA and show that he or she knew
about the law.127 Also, the contract can include a representation stating that none of the employees of the agent, consult120
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ant, or counsel is a government employee,128 which can exclude
liability that would arise from any payments to a foreign official.129 The agreement can also include covenants through
which the local agrees to not perform any of the actions prohibited by the FCPA.130 Another covenant that will help ensure
compliance with the FCPA is a requirement that the local
make all payments through check or legitimate electronic
transfer from a bank.131 Specifically, the agreement can stipulate that the agreement is voided and terminated upon performance of any action prohibited by the FCPA and that the project sponsor does not have to pay.132 Furthermore, a contract
can provide the project sponsor with a right of action to recuperate the funds that the agent or other local used in committing a prohibited act.133 Presenting these contractual obligations to a local can help measure the local’s willingness to
comply with the FCPA; if the local refuses to sign, it could be a
warning sign of FCPA danger.134 More importantly, these
safeguards will help prevent FCPA liability based on actions of
locals.
Contractual agreements alone, however, are not enough to
prevent liability.135 The project parties can seek additional protection through close monitoring and supervision of FCPArelated actions; telling the local actor once is not enough, and
continuous inspection of the local’s activities is essential.136
Project sponsors should actively implement a compliance program that will prevent FCPA violations, such as regularly
scheduled training programs in the local language for agents
and other local actors.137 When any of the project parties becomes aware of potential violations, it should conduct an extensive investigation to identify violations, improve the effective-
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ness of the compliance program,138 and prepare for a DOJ investigation.139 A sponsor must pay attention to the warning
signs, which could be family relationships between the local
and foreign officials, a local’s insistence that he or she be paid
in cash, requests by the local for false paperwork to be produced, or a general culture of bribery in the country.140 By performing extensive due diligence on the potential agent’s reputation and background, requiring contractual guarantees, and
closely monitoring the agent’s work, a project sponsor can protect itself from FCPA liability arising from the actions of local
agents, consultants, and lawyers.
C. Choosing and Using a Project Vehicle
An important decision the project sponsor makes is what
form the project company will take on to carry out the project.141 This decision will depend on factors that are specific to
each project, including the desired ratio of debt and equity, tax
and other laws of the country where the project will occur, how
much control any of the parties wishes to exert on the project
company, what the lender prefers, and so forth.142 Often, a
parent company wants to be separated from the project in order to avoid liability and tax complications, which often results
in a special-purpose vehicle (“SPV”) created only for the project.143 The project parties can thus remove risk unrelated to
the project, but separateness in documentation and behavior
should be visible in the contracting process for the SPV to remain its separate status.144 While a “single-purpose corporate
subsidiary” is common due to its limited liability, the SPV can
be another entity, such as a general partnership, limited partnership, limited liability company, joint venture, or a combination of vehicles.145 This project company is often incorporated

138

See, e.g., MAYER BROWN LLP, supra note 31, at 5.
See, e.g., TARUN, supra note 22, at 30.
140 Id. at 25–26.
141 See HOFFMAN, supra note 65, at 83.
142 Id. at 85–86.
143 Id.
144 Id.
145 Id. at 87–92.
139

2012] WHEN “NOT GETTING CAUGHT” IS NOT ENOUGH 129

in the host country.146
Because project parties can be responsible for a surprising
amount of FCPA liability for the actions of SPVs, it is important to analyze this liability when the project sponsor
chooses a vehicle. After choosing a vehicle, project sponsors
must understand how to use the SPV to minimize the possibility of liability. An issuer, domestic concern, or “any person”
can be liable for using some form of interstate commerce to
make, promise, authorize, or offer a bribe to “any person” who
he or she knows will use the item of value in furtherance of a
prohibited action.147 More specifically, a parent (here the project sponsor) can be liable for a foreign-incorporated subsidiary’s (here the SPV’s) actions if it “in some way directs, authorizes, or knowingly acquiesces in the prohibited conduct.”148 The
DOJ must only establish that the parent had knowledge of the
wrongdoing.149 A parent cannot use its subsidiary as an intermediary for making bribes.150 The foreign-incorporated SPV
itself is not subject to the FCPA,151 even if the parent is,152 unless it uses some form of interstate commerce to take a step toward breaking the FCPA.153 The parent will not be subject to
liability if the foreign subsidiary performs an FCPA-prohibited
action without parent involvement or knowledge.154
The level of control that the parent exerts on the subsidiary can help establish knowledge because a controlling parent
is more likely to know about violations.155 Some common law
agency factors that can establish control are common directors
or officers, payment by the parent of the subsidiary’s salaries, a
high level of involvement in the subsidiary’s daily activities, ef-
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fective control of the subsidiary, whether the subsidiary only
does business with the parent, and so forth.156 If the parent
does not control the subsidiary, liability is not as likely but
could be found if the parent has considerable influence in the
subsidiary, representation on its board, or a significant financial stake and does not make efforts to prevent the actions.157
The level of control a partner exerts is also an important
aspect in determining liability based on the actions of joint ventures, another type of vehicle that some projects use. Where
the joint venture majority partner is subject to the FCPA, liability could exist when another partner commits a prohibited
action because the majority partner will be presumed to have
had control over the venture.158 If the minority partner is an
official in the host government or a government-owned entity,
any payment could be considered improper, and liability exists
depending on the majority partner’s knowledge.159 For any foreign partner that has already made an FCPA-prohibited action,
a payment by the U.S. partner might be considered a reimbursement and liability could exist if the U.S. partner has the
requisite knowledge.160 Where the minority partner is subject
to the FCPA, it still can be liable for prohibited payments even
though it does not exercise the same control as a majority partner.161
As is usually the case with FCPA liability, however, careful
and extensive due diligence can protect parties as they use special vehicles to complete a project.162 Controlling parents can
train their subsidiaries on the FCPA, have them sign statements of understanding that show the importance of compliance, and give guidelines on keeping the FCPA in mind when
hiring employees and using agents.163 A noncontrolling parent
can also file a formal protest, make demands that the subsidiary stop the action, document its opposition, and consider end-
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ing the relationship if the improper behavior does not cease.164
For joint venture vehicles, the partners that are subject to the
FCPA should review the contacts of the joint venture partner.165 A wise joint venture partner will insert FCPA compliance into the agreement and perform due diligence on the reputation of the partner.166
Asking how funds are spent,
inquiring about FCPA violations, and demanding access to the
financial records of the partnership are useful forms of due diligence to ensure that the partnership is complying and that
there will be no liability.167
Project sponsors should consider the FCPA as they choose
a vehicle and be aware of what liability could arise from this
relationship. Subsidiaries and joint ventures can be particularly problematic. Regardless of what project vehicle is chosen, it
is essential that vehicles know about the FCPA and comply
with it to prevent liability for project sponsors.
D. Liability from Other Project Parties’ Actions
Because of the extensive potential for vicarious liability
under the FCPA, one might wonder whether a project party
can be liable for the actions of project parties other than the
project company. Can a commercial lender, for example, ever
be liable for a local agent’s improper payment or would a project sponsor be liable when the project operator pays a small
bribe to have a government inspector look the other way? One
of the problems with answering these questions, and a prevailing issue with FCPA compliance, is the lack of case law.168 The
majority of parties that come under DOJ investigation based on
the anti-bribery provisions plead guilty or settle.169 Thus, there
is little case law, and even less in relation to project finance.
Understanding how the DOJ enforces the FCPA, however, can
help project participants understand how to avoid any problems that arise from the actions of others.
The statute specifically prohibits committing a prohibited
164
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action through a third party while knowing that the third party
will perform the action.170 Thus, obviously, if a lender is tired
of delays and tells a contractor or operator to pay a bribe, the
lender will be liable, however unlikely this situation seems.
Furthermore, a lender is unlikely to be liable for a bribe that a
debtor makes because seems far enough removed from the situation to be considered a principal or employer. A creditor can
be considered a principal if there is enough control over the actions of the debtor,171 and control can be a factor in determining
vicarious liability.172 It is nevertheless a stretch to hold the
lender liable for FCPA violations without more control over the
project.
As mentioned above, a project sponsor can be liable for the
actions of a special-purpose subsidiary or joint venture.173 Concerning the actions of the contractor or operator, a sponsor
could be liable for actions where the sponsor had some control
over these parties.174 Similarly, a contractor can likely be held
liable for the actions of the subcontractor.175 For the project
sponsor or any project party to be liable for the actions of a contractor, subcontractor, operator, or any other party will likely
depend on the level of control and knowledge that the project
sponsor had. These situations seem different from the relationship between the project sponsor and the project company
because the contractor and operator are not subsidiaries or
partners of the sponsor. Yet the project sponsor still might
have some sort of control over these parties or knowledge as defined by the FCPA and enforced by the DOJ. Regardless of
how probable or remote liability is for any of the project parties
due to the actions of another party, the participants should
protect themselves by making FCPA compliance a standard
part of their contracts with each other.176
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E. Working with the Host Government
Project finance requires a great deal of negotiation with
and approvals from foreign governments. These requirements
mean that parties to a project are often vulnerable to bribe solicitations, especially in countries where bribes are customary.177 Throughout the course of a project, contact with the
host government will come in many forms. A project will need
to acquire licenses, authorizations, permits, and concessions.178
These concessions include agreements that the government
gives to the project company to “develop, construct, and operate
the project,”179 building permits,180 and environmental permits
for issues relating to waste water, electricity, oil, and air.181
With environmental permits, and potentially with other areas,
the regulations can come from the local, state or provincial, or
federal government of the country.182
Often, host governments will sponsor a bidding process to
determine which contractor should be able to carry out the project.183 Also, the project sponsor or company will negotiate letters of intent,184 memoranda of understanding,185 concession
agreements,186 implementation agreements,187 approval of political risk insurance,188 preliminary agreements on important
items that the government can provide such as enhanced infrastructure near the project,189 waivers of sovereign immunities,190 build-own-transfer agreements,191 and arbitration
agreements.192 All of these negotiations that require collabora-
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tion with government officials increase the susceptibility of a
party to the project to make an improper payment.
Making payments to the government is unavoidable when
acquiring approvals requires paying fees. The FCPA allows
payments for routine governmental actions, which include services “ordinarily and commonly performed” by foreign officials.193 It is often difficult to tell, however, whether a payment
that a government official requires is a normal fee or a bribe.
Project parties can protect themselves by focusing on the words
and guidance of the statute to compare the fee and action with
those the government ordinarily performs.194 Furthermore, a
party can protect itself by requiring that all payments to the
government be approved by senior management or counsel before they happen.195 Also, it is wise to require that payments
be made to legitimate bank accounts in the host country, not
banks in third countries unless in exceptional circumstances.196
This was one source of trouble for Baker Hughes in its FCPA
investigation; a wholly owned subsidiary paid over $4 million
to “Consulting Firm A” located on the Isle of Man at the request of Kazakhstan’s state oil company in return for no services from “Consulting Firm A.”197 Furthermore, payments
should never be made in cash or to third parties.198
When a red flag arises here or in other FCPA-related project situations, any issuer or domestic concern can ask the DOJ
for an opinion on whether the prospective behavior is legal.199
The transaction must be real and not hypothetical, and the request usually comes before the requesting party accepts the
deal.200 The request must come from an issuer or domestic con-
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cern who is a party to the transaction,201 and the opinion is not
applicable to anyone who is not a party in the opinion request.202 The request must be specific and include all of the information about the potential conduct that the DOJ needs to
make an opinion, and the information must be accurate and
truthful.203 The DOJ will respond to a complete request within
thirty days of receipt and can initiate an investigation if it
wants to.204 The written opinion signed by the Attorney General or a designee is a statement that the requesting party can
rely on.205 Thirty days might seem like a long time when a deal
is pending, but protection against liability is worth the wait.
V. CONCLUSION
As Stuart Deming says, “the purpose and language of the
FCPA appear to be straightforward in nature . . . [yet] [i]ts
scope and means of application can be complex and lead to
dramatically unexpected results.”206 This reality is especially
true in the project finance setting because of the number of
parties and variety of relationships between themselves and
with the host government. While only a few of the risks are
discussed here, the parties can use the same measures to protect themselves in any situation where FCPA liability is a possibility. Contractual guarantees, due diligence, proper training, and closely monitoring activities are necessary activities
that can help a project avoid FCPA violations and liability.
Most importantly, taking these active steps helps create a “culture of compliance”207 within a project where a commandment
that better avoids FCPA problems than “don’t get caught” exists: don’t make bribes.
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